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Air cargo security: more questions than answers

Air cargo security: more questions than answers

TSA admits US August screening target cannot be met, while next month's EU deadline remains mired in confusion

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Acting TSA director Gale Rossides told a finance sub-committee of the Homeland Security Department on 4 March that cargo on domestic US passenger flights could meet the 3 August deadline for 100% screening, but international flights could require a further two years. 

This is because of problems getting co-operation from the governments of the 20 countries responsible for around 85% of air freight shipments to the US.

The TSA has been making clear since last year that the August deadline would be missed. But Rossides’ two-year estimate is the longest delay in complying with the regulation that has yet been made public.

Warren Miller, manager of the TSA’s international air cargo unit, speaking at a Lufthansa Cargo air freight security conference in Frankfurt on the same day that Rossides dropped her bombshell in Washington, said the agency had already advised the US Congress twice that August was unachievable.

Miller, whose unit was set up only 18 months ago, said the TSA had been “myopic” in dealing first and exclusively with domestic US air freight movements. “We were focused on internal challenges, so most of our energy went there,” he told delegates.

The scale of the problem is immense. The US imports 1.5 million tonnes of air freight a year from 97 countries.

“We must increase security without impeding the free flow of commerce. There is no ‘magic bullet’, no single answer,” Miller said. A long-term, layered approach based on risk targeting was needed, but he admitted: “We’re not even at pilot stage.”

The death in December of Ed Kelly, head of the TSA’s security branch since September 2006, has clearly been a major setback. A lifelong freight industry executive, overseeing a staff of more than 50 at the agency’s Washington headquarters, Kelly had been striving to develop security programmes to enable the 9/11 Act to be implemented in a workable way.

Miller said the TSA had learned from its domestic US experience that focusing on the supply chain was the best way forward for imports, too. But although harmonising and strengthening global standards was a start, he said: “They’re not as binding as we would like.”

The main tool in Europe is to be EU Framework Regulation 300/2008, which comes into force on 29 April and replaces Aviation Security Regulation 2320/2002. By harmonising security procedures, this is designed to make it easier for shippers and forwarders in Europe to comply with the tougher US regime.

Eckard Seebohm, head of the EC’s aviation security unit, said the previous regulation had been passed in haste after 9/11. Mistakes had been made, and initial recommendations had gone direct into law without amendment. A working group including shippers, forwarders, airlines and airports had been examining the issues for the last two to three years.

The new regulation clarified the issues and solved some of the problems, Seebohm said. It incorporated three new elements: independent validation of known consignors, which he admitted was a “huge challenge”; a mandatory EU cargo database embracing known and unknown or unaccredited consignors; and a distinction between direct and transit cargo.

The EU-US Transport Security Co-operation cargo working group had identified parallels in cargo standards and screening objectives, and was trying to agree a balanced approach to 100% screening.

X-raying every piece “could be a nightmare” and the US may have to accept alternatives, Seebohm said. It needed to be established whether sniffer dogs were an acceptable alternative.

In any case, a three-year transition period was essential to allow systems to be introduced that would eliminate pinch points at airports. “We first thought a shorter period would be possible, but it’s complex,” he said.

Singling out the UK for special mention, Seebohm added: “There are many preparations still to be made in some countries.”

The one-stop EU philosophy should ensure that each member state recognises known consignors and regulated agents in the rest of the community. Its template for validation should, nevertheless, set the industry’s fears at rest about over-complication, but Seebohm said he expected the number of known consignors to reduce sharply after 29 April, with many smaller consignors simply not bothering.

Harald Zielinski, head of security and environmental management at Lufthansa Cargo, said there was no answer on how much accreditation would cost. He unsure what would happen if 20,000 of Germany’s 50,000-60,000 consignors decided they could not afford it.

Harald Zielinski, head of security and environmental management at Lufthansa Cargo
Harald Zielinski, head of security and environmental management at Lufthansa Cargo

Would shippers of five items a year accept the cost of accreditation, asked Roland Mandel, dangerous goods safety adviser to Lufthansa? Would sub-contractors be obliged to declare they acted for a consignor and conformed with the regulations? How would they be authorised, and where were the independent validators for Germany?

Hans-Henning Mühlke, of the LBA (the German federal aviation office), said it had 83 staff of whom 55 were involved in security. It planned to add 200 more to deal with the security function. He was confident the LBA could meet the industry’s requirements, but it still needed to secure a budget from the German government for this. In the medium term, third-party validators would have to be involved.

Jürgen Knipfer, supply chain manager for Siemens, said: “I believe in taking supply chain security very seriously. But certified consignor status will increase our costs drastically. Do all 80 of my locations have to be certified every five years?”

He was not clear how parts brought in from external suppliers would be classified, or how those could be linked into the system.

“It’s impossible to comply with all regimes. They have different standards and administration processes, but they don’t increase security. Can we ever really be certified safe?” Knipfer asked. “What will be the impact on air freight delivery times? And what is the additional cost?”

Steffen Pabst, quality and security manager for Kuehne & Nagel in central Europe, said not all inbound supplies were broken down. A pharmaceutical manufacturer may never open finished products that came in by sea or were trucked from Russia or a third country.

A representative of Volkswagen said not just smaller shippers but even large manufacturers would question whether to bother seeking authorised status. “Everything we do, except some vehicles we manufacture for the domestic market, is theoretically air freight,” he said.

“It’s so broad, where do you start and end with accreditation? How do you build up shipments from your in-house departments and parts producers? Do you just dump them all at the airport as non-secure goods?

Knipfer said many elements of Regulation 300/2008 were already covered by the Authorised Economic Operator regime, so it was not necessary to reinvent everything.

But a representative of a major chemical manufacturer doubted such synergies existed. She was still waiting to see the benefits of the C-TPAT scheme, which had not removed the requirement for an AEO inspection.

A freight forwarder delegate said his firm built its own pallets, but the airline had to break them down for re-inspection. He asked how soon could his company expect to be recognised as an “indirect air carrier” to prevent this happening for shipments to the US?


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